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For many years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has been watching 
the Department of Defense (DoD) as it has been implementing GAO-recommended 
reforms to weapon-system acquisition and contract management. In its biennial high-risk 
overview, Mihm’s report for the GAO identified several areas of concern in DoD business 
practices. Weapons-system acquisition and contract management were listed in the top 
seven high-risk areas identified for reform (Mihm, 2019). In fact, reform of business 
practices within the DoD is a common thread addressed in the overview of 2019 defense 
budget as well (Defense Budget Overview, 2018). In the 2019 budget overview, the 
Secretary of Defense clearly charged the services to conduct a thorough overview of their 
business practices and identify areas where each military department could gain efficiency 
in acquisition and contract management (Defense Budget Overview, 2018). The 2019 
budget report overview states, “a Defense Acquisition System that facilitates speed and 
agility in support of the aforementioned objective is key. As threat capabilities have 
continued to rapidly evolve, it is essential that the system supports out-pacing of the 
Nation’s near-peer adversaries’ capabilities” (Defense Budget Overview, 2018, p. 7.2). 
Further, former Secretary of Defense Mattis stated in the report: 
If you don't get the resources—my closing words—then your strategy is 
nothing more than a hallucination, because, without the resources, there's just 
so much brave young men and women can do. (Defense Budget Overview, 
2018, p 2.9) 
From this charge in 2019, Air Force Acquisition leaders began developing lines of 
effort to meet the Secretary’s guidance. The first step was to change the Air Force mindset 
that contracting professionals are simply business advisors. As the Air Force’s Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Contracting, Major General Cameron Holt charged the Air Force 
contracting workforce to become mission-focused business leaders. Air Force contracting 
professionals must be able to think strategically, execute efficiently, and manage 
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acquisitions like corporate business leaders (AF Flight Plan, 2019). In doing this, we could 
bring about true acquisition reform and meet the Secretary’s call for change. 
However, developing mission-focused business leaders may also require a new way 
to train the workforce and assess contracting competencies. It could mean a new 
competency framework for the Air Force contracting workforce that should consider both 
the buyer and the seller activities. For example, when a solicitation is issued by the buyer 
(government), there are several tasks or competencies on the buyer’s side to getting a 
solicitation ready for industry. A solicitation is how the government (buyer) notifies 
industry (seller) of requirements for contract and it is also commonly referred to as a 
request for proposal. However, many Air Force buyers are unfamiliar with the 
competencies and tasks associated with the seller’s activities when responding to a 
solicitation. We believe that in order to be a valuable mission-focused business leader, the 
Air Force contracting workforce must understand both sides of the buyer-seller 
relationship. There are several frameworks available to train the workforce and accomplish 
these goals, including the current DoD Contracting Competency Model and the National 
Contract Management Association’s (NCMA) Contract Management Body of Knowledge 
(CMBOK) Contract Management Standard (CMS). Either of these models could help the 
Air Force develop competent personnel and the goal of becoming stronger mission-focused 
business leaders. It is the CMS, however, that focuses on both buyer and seller tasks. 
An avenue to gauge the Air Force contracting workforce’s competency in these 
buyer-seller tasks is through training, formal and informal, as well as through inspections. 
As the DoD contracting workforce progresses in the career field, three levels of training 
are required under the DoD’s currently approved training courses to meet the goals of a 
competent workforce. Another avenue is evaluation of DoD contracting organizations by 
the DoD Inspector General’s office. These evaluations result in reports that identify 
deficiencies and actionable recommendations to ensure compliance. Finally, individual 
organizations maintain self-inspection programs that provide an additional mode to assess 
compliance with regulations and statutes on a regular basis. The Air Force assesses itself 
through a self-inspection program, which not only prepares the contracting organization 
3 
for the DoD Inspector General’s inspection, but it also identifies trends to provide training 
opportunities at the organizational level, thus creating internal controls. 
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to conduct an analysis of DoD Inspector General 
reported contract management deficiencies and align these deficiencies with the third-party 
accredited National Contract Management Association (NCMA) Contract Management 
Standard (CMS) competency framework. Our research will focus specifically on the 
analysis of the Air Force contract management deficiencies to determine how the reported 
deficiencies are aligned under the CMS competency framework. The analysis of the 
alignment of the reported deficiencies with the CMS competency framework may identify 
knowledge gaps in the contracting workforce and provide opportunities for additional 
training, thus improving workforce competency. The CMS was chosen as the competency 
framework for our research since it fulfills with the direction given to the Secretary of 
Defense in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act to adopt or establish 
a third-party accredited competency standard for the acquisition workforce (NDAA, 2020). 
Additionally, since the Air Force contracting organizations use self-inspection 
checklists as part of internal controls to prepare for these DoD Inspector General 
inspections, this research will also include an analysis of the contracting self-inspection 
checklist and its alignment with the CMS competency model. This analysis will determine 
the extent that the Air Force contracting self-inspection checklist items are aligned with the 
CMS contract management life cycle. The analysis of the alignment of the self-inspection 
checklist items with the CMS competency model may identify gaps in the Air Force 
contracting self-inspection program and provide opportunities for revising the self-
inspection checklists to better align with the CMS competency model, thus improving 
internal controls for Air Force contracting organizations. 
Improving contracting workforce competency and organizational internal controls will 
assist in creating an Air Force contracting workforce that meets the Air Force Acquisition 
leadership’s call for the development of effective mission-focused business leaders. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The objectives of our research are captured by answering the following questions: 
1. How do Air Force contracting deficiencies reported by the DoD IG align 
with the NCMA CMS competency model? 
2. How does the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist align with 
the NCMA CMS competency model? 
3. Based on the analysis of the DoD IG reported Air Force contracting 
deficiencies and the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist, what 
opportunities for additional training for the contracting workforce and 
opportunities for revisions to the self-inspection checklists were 
identified? 
D. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
An analysis of inspection reports and self-inspection checklists provide valuable 
data to identify gaps in proficiency and knowledge. The information gathered from such 
an analysis can be utilized to develop training curricula that prepare contracting 
professionals to perform complex functions effectively, thus improving workforce 
competency. This effective use of capabilities to meet schedule, cost and performance 
while meeting the needs of the warfighter aligns with being good stewards of taxpayer 
money. Also, since the Air Force uses self-inspection checklists as an internal control 
within contracting activities, the information gathered may be utilized to reassess or revise 
this tool to ensure effective control of the contract management process. 
A benefit to the research is encompassed in the direction given to the Secretary of 
Defense in the most recent National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In the fiscal year 
(FY) 2020 NDAA, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to define competency 
standards and adopt a third-party accredited certification program for the acquisition 
workforce. If a third-party accredited national or international standards certification 
program does not already exist for an acquisition career field, the Secretary of Defense is 
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required to establish a certification requirement that aligns with national or international 
accrediting organization practices (NDAA, 2020). 
A limitation of this research is the age of the data, DoD IG reports from 2003 to 
2010 were utilized. While the data is over a decade old, this historical information is still 
relevant and provides an opportunity to identify patterns and consistencies, while assisting 
in identifying areas for focused training, formal and informal, in the contract management 
life cycle.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
Figure 1 depicts the conceptual framework for this research. The methodology is 
based on auditability theory. Auditability theory and its concepts are fully explained in 
Chapter II. On the left side of the diagram (Figure 1), are the reported DoD IG deficiencies 
and the organizational self-inspection checklist, which are the two key components of this 
research. In the middle, is the industry accredited standard, the CMS. Both the 
organizational self-inspection checklist and the reported DoD IG deficiencies are aligned 
against the CMS. The next step identifies opportunities for training, as well as opportunities 
for improvements to the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist. Finally, the right 
side of the diagram reflects the results of the research. The identified gaps in training will 
support the competent personnel side of the auditability triangle, while the identified gaps 
in the self-inspection checklist will support the effective internal control side of the 
auditability triangle. Therefore, this research supports enhanced auditability to both 
competent personnel and effective internal controls. 
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Source: R. Rendon, email to author, June 4, 2020. 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework for this Research. 
The methodology of this research is multi-faceted, it begins with a literature review, 
followed by alignment of the Air Force DoD IG deficiencies and the Air Force Contracting 
Self-Inspection Checklist within the task areas of the NCMA CMBOK CMS competency 
framework. The alignment will aid in identifying gaps and patterns that then can be used 
to ascertain focused training areas for the Air Force contracting workforce. Our research 
will also identify gaps in the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist.  
The literature review will begin with a discussion of auditability theory and provide 
an overview of the development of current standards and competencies. It will also cover 
the source of the congressional mandate to the Secretary of Defense in the FY2020 NDAA 
to adopt a third-party accredited standard. The literature review includes a synopsis of 
selected contract competencies currently utilized by both Government and industry and a 
description of the CMBOK CMS competency framework. 
The final element of this research consists of analyzing the DoD IG deficiencies 
and the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist compared to the CMBOK CMS. 
The analysis may expose patterns in the DoD IG deficiencies that can be traced to the three 
phases of the contract management life cycle as well as provide opportunities to revise the 
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self-inspection checklist to better align with the CMBOK CMS. Overall, a connection 
should be revealed between contracting workforce competency, internal controls, and 
utilization of the CMBOK CMS as a training tool and an inspection guideline. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This research is organized into five chapters. Chapter I provides an introduction of 
the research to the reader on the background, purpose of the research, research questions 
to be addressed in this report, the benefits and limitations of the research, the methodology 
used to gather the information for the report, and finally, the report’s organization. 
Chapter II captures the literature review conducted during the process of writing 
this report. The literature review covers auditability theory, the Advisory Panel on 
Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulation, commonly referred to as the Section 
809 Panel, the FY2020 NDAA, standard-setting and accreditation, and selected contracting 
competency standards. Chapter III provides background information on the Air Force 
Contracting mission, organization and structure. It also discusses the Air Force contracting 
activities to which the authors are assigned providing a good cross-section of different Air 
Force missions and contract management activities. Each of these organizations utilizes 
the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist in a manner directed by the Air Force 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) Mandatory Procedure (MP) at 
MP5301.601-91, Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Program. Chapter IV presents the 
research results and recommended areas in the contract management life cycle for training 
opportunities and improvement in the self-inspection program. Chapter V concludes the 
study with a summary and suggested areas for future research. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the background for conducting this research. It also 
described the purpose and identified three key questions to be answered as a result of this 
research. We discussed the benefits and limitations of the study, as well as the methodology 
used in our analysis. Lastly, this chapter provided information on how the report is 
organized. The next chapter provides a discussion of the literature reviewed for auditability 
theory, the advisory panel for streamlining and codifying acquisition regulations (Section 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This literature review discusses articles, books and government documents relating 
to contract management and competencies. This chapter begins with a theoretical 
discussion of the basis of our research, specifically auditability theory. Auditability theory 
offers organizations assurances that their processes are operating within ethical and 
acceptable guidelines (Power, 1996). The chapter further discusses the Advisory Panel on 
streamlining acquisitions, the National Defense Authorization Act and its implications for 
this research. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the DoD Contracting Competency 
and the NCMA Contract Body of Knowledge Contract Management Standard. 
B. AUDITABILITY THEORY 
According to Rendon (2019), “auditability theory is concerned with those aspects 
of governance needed by organizations to ensure successful achievement of mission goals 
and objectives” (p. 88). Power (1996) explains that auditability is less about conducting an 
audit or an inspection as it is about “making things auditable” (p. 289). Peters et al. (2019) 
explain, “in order to ‘make things auditable’ organizations must establish an institutionally 
acceptable knowledge base and a system of processes and practices that supports 
auditability” (Power, 1996, p.7). 
Three main components form the foundation for auditability theory. Past literature 
reviews have been done on auditability and this paper utilizes a similar structure as was 
covered in Peters et al (2019). Rendon and Rendon describe these components as the 
“auditability triangle.” The auditability triangle, as shown in Figure 2, is created by 
reflecting the three components, competent personnel, capable processes, and effective 
internal controls (Rendon & Rendon, 2016). According to Rendon and Rendon (2016), 
“organizations need a competent workforce, capable processes, and effective internal 
controls to ensure mission success” (p. 1). Each component of the auditability triangle will 
be discussed in further detail below. 
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Figure 2. Auditability Triangle. Source: Rendon and Rendon (2015). 
1. Competent Personnel  
Rendon and Rendon (2015) define the competent personnel component of the 
triangle as personnel with the “necessary education, training, and experience requirements 
for each functional area” (p. 716). The DoD acquisition workforce of 1102 Occupational 
Code Series Contracting employees currently use the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) requirements to establish a competent workforce. DAWIA 
was put in place to mandate that the DoD Acquisition personnel meet proficiency 
requirements for professional certification. Within 24 months of obtaining an 1102 
position, the employee must obtain the required level of functional training, and meet 
experience requirements (DAWIA, 1990). 
DAWIA was established in an attempt to develop and reform the acquisition 
workforce. In the Packard Commission Report entitled: A Formula for Action: A Report to 
the President on Defense Acquisition (1986), the commissioner explained that the 
acquisition workforce was inexperienced and undertrained compared to their industry 
counterparts (Peters et al., 2019). The commissioner stated that 
among acquisition personnel, contract specialists have an especially critical 
role. Contract specialists must master the extensive, complex body of 
knowledge encompassing material and operations management, contract law, 
cost analysis, negotiation techniques, and industrial marketing. Yet the Office 
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of Personnel Management designates the Contract Specialist personnel series 
as administrative and not professional series. (1986, p. 29) 
Following this report, the DAWIA requirements were established and made into public law 
on 5 November 1990. Following the commissioner’s suggestion, these requirements 
created a minimum education and training expectations to develop the acquisition 
workforce. 
2. Capable Processes 
The capable process component of auditability theory is defined by Rendon and 
Rendon as processes that are “fully-established, institutionalized, mandated, and integrated 
with other organizational processes, periodically measured, and continuously improved” 
(2015, p. 716). 
In relation to the DoD procurement workforce, these activities include the phases 
of the contract management life cycle. These phases include procurement planning, 
solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and contract 
closeout (Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p. 716). It is important for the DoD procurement 
workforce to be proficient and knowledgeable in these phases of the contract management 
life cycle since the result of these processes accounts for at least two-thirds of the federal 
government’s spending (Stalcup, 2009). The GAO has given DoD contract management a 
high-risk rating, which confirms the importance of making sure there are clear and effective 
capable processes in place to assure effective use of government spending (Peters et al, 
2019). Garrett and Rendon (2015) explain that, “effective contracts depend, to a great 
extent on the processes used to create those contracts, [and], in order to award and 
successfully manage effective contracts, organizations must have mature contract 
management processes in place” (p. 80). Not only do organizations need to have “mature 
contract management processes in place,” but according to Rendon, they need to take 
measures to integrate with other organizational processes, and be improved continuously 
(2016, p.754). 
The DoD uses the DAWIA requirements in an attempt to build up a competent 
workforce, however, successful award and management of contracts may rely more heavily 
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on organizations capable processes rather than their individual workers’ competencies. In 
Rendon’s research, referenced work from Deming (1986) explains process capability is 
“85% of quality problems are related to processes, while only 15% of problems are 
controlled by individual workers” (p. 24). This research emphasizes the importance of the 
DoD having capable processes in place in order to successfully execute and manage 
contracts. 
An example of assessing capable processes within the Air Force is the use of the 
Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM). This model focuses on the key practice 
areas to measure the capabilities within each of the six key process areas. Rendon explains 
“the CMMM provides the organization with a detailed roadmap for improving the 
capability of its contract management processes” (2008, p. 207). He goes on to say, “The 
six key process areas and related practice activities allow the organization to focus specific 
areas and activities involved in the procurement” (Rendon, 2008, p. 205). The following 
are the six process areas with an explanation of the key activities within each area:  
1. Procurement Planning: involves determining whether to procure, how to 
procure, what to procure, how much to procure, and when to procure.  
2. Solicitation Planning: involves documenting program requirements and 
identifying potential sources. 
3. Solicitation: process of obtaining bids or proposals from prospective 
sellers on how organizational needs can be met. 
4. Source Selection: process of obtaining bids or proposals and applying 
evaluation criteria to select a provider.  
5. Contract Administration: process of ensuring that each party’s 
performance meets contractual requirements  
6. Contract Closeouts: involves completing and settling the contract, 
including resolving any open items. (Rendon, 2008, p. 208) 
In addition to the six key process areas, the CMMM also has five levels of maturity. 
The five levels of maturity in order from least mature to most mature are Level 1- Ad hoc, 
Level 2-Basic, Level 3-Structured, Level 4- Integrated, and Level 5- Optimized (Rendon). 
Rendon clarifies, “the five maturity levels reflected in the model allow an organization to 
assess its level of capability for each of the six key process areas of the procurement 
process” (Rendon, 2008, p. 207). 
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Past research on assessing Air Force contract management process capability using 
the CMMM has shown that the procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, 
and source selection processes are generally assessed at CMMM Level 3 or higher. 
Additionally, the contract administration and contract closeout processes are generally 
assessed at CMMM Level 2 or lower (Jackson, 2007; Peters et al., 2019; Chang et al., 2012; 
Burton & Nordin, 2007; Sheehan et al., 2007). 
3. Effective Internal Controls 
The effective internal controls component of the auditability triangle is described 
by Rendon and Rendon as “referring to the objectives of enforcing internal control policies 
to ensure compliance with laws and regulations, monitoring procedures to assess 
enforcement and reporting any material weaknesses” (Rendon and Rendon, 2016, p.754). 
According to The GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, also 
known as the Green Book. 
Internal control comprises the plans, methods, policies, and procedures used 
to fulfill the mission, strategic plan, goals, and objectives of the entity. 
Internal control serves as the first line of defense in safeguarding assets. In 
short, internal control helps managers achieve desired results through 
effective stewardship of public resources. (Green Book, 2014, p. 6) 
The Green Book also explains that “internal control is not one event, but a series of 
actions that occur throughout an entity’s operations” (Green Book, 2014, p.6). 
The GAO’s Green Book describes a hierarchy that includes requirements for 
internal control in the federal government. It is a structure of five components and 17 
principles. This structure was adapted from The Committee on Sponsoring Organizations 
(COSO) of the Treadway Commission, for a government environment (Green Book, 2014). 
The five components are as follows: 
• Control Environment - The foundation for an internal control system. It 
provides the discipline and structure to help an entity achieve its 
objectives. 
• Risk Assessment - Assesses the risks facing the entity as it seeks to 
achieve its objectives. This assessment provides the basis for developing 
appropriate risk responses. 
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• Control Activities - The actions management establishes through 
policies and procedures to achieve objectives and respond to risks in the 
internal control system, which includes the entity’s information system. 
• Information and Communication - The quality information management 
and personnel communicate and use to support the internal control 
system. 
• Monitoring - Activities management establishes and operates to assess 
the quality of performance over time and promptly resolve the findings 
of audits and other reviews. (Green Book, 2014, pp. 7-8) 
The Green Book defends that “the five components of integrated control must be 
effectively designed, implemented and operating, and operating together in an integrated 
manner, for an internal control system to be effective” (Green Book, 2014, p. 7). However, 
it should be noted that although having effective internal controls in place assure 
organizations will have a higher success rate in meeting their objectives. The GAO warns 
that organizations are not immune from failure and is largely to do with the organization’s 
personnel (Green Book, 2014).  
Through auditability theory, we see the importance of a competent workforce. In 
the next few sections, we will discuss the various levels of legislation that call the 
department to enable a competent workforce. The next section will discuss the implications 
of the Section 809 Panel on the contracting workforce. 
C. ADVISORY PANEL ON STREAMLINING AND CODIFYING 
ACQUISITION REGULATION 
The Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulation was 
established by Congress in the FY2016 NDAA and amended in the FY2017 NDAA. This 
panel’s mission was to address a central problem of using antiquated and cumbersome 
processes to attain the needs of the warfighter in today’s global environment. This advisory 
panel is commonly referred to as the Section 809 Panel in Air Force contracting. This is in 
reference to the section in the 2016 NDAA which mandated the advisory panel. All 
instances of 809 Panel, or simply the Panel, in this paper refer to the formal Advisory Panel 
for Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulation. By statute, the Section 809 Panel, 
“was formed to review the acquisition regulations applicable to the Department of Defense 
(DoD) with a view toward streamlining and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
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the Defense acquisition process and maintain defense technology advantage” (DTIC, 
Section 809 Panel Interim Report, 2017, p. 5). The Panel was also charged with 
recommending regulations and statutes that could be repealed or amended to remove 
unnecessary processes while improving the acquisition timeline and still continue to abide 
by financial regulations and maintain integrity and ethics in the acquisition process to 
protect the interests of the DoD (DTIC, 2017). 
The 809 Panel’s Interim Report stated that over the last five decades, numerous 
reports and analyses have been completed that are focused on DoD’s acquisition processes. 
While small reform changes have been instituted over time, these incremental changes have 
not been effective in solving ongoing problems in an ever-evolving playing field. In fact, 
according to the Panel Report, “incremental approaches have exacerbated problems with 
the acquisition system by adding more layers of sign off, mountains of paperwork, and 
hundreds of additional regulations. DoD must implement bold approaches and bold 
solutions to produce true reform” (p. 2). 
According to the Section 809 Panel’s 2019 roadmap report, it  
was charged with reviewing the acquisition regulations and statutes 
applicable to DoD with a view toward streamlining and improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the defense acquisition process. In the course 
of this review, Congress expected the Panel to make recommendations for 
the amendment or repeal of regulations and statutes. (p. 1) 
Recommendations for amending or repealing rules that are not adding value to the 
acquisition process will remove hindrances to the process and add time to the overall 
acquisition timeline. Not only did the Panel outline a road map but it also “provided draft 
regulatory and statutory changes to assist DoD and Congress with implementing those 
recommendations” (DTIC, 809 Panel Roadmap, 2019, p. 1). A series of five reports were 
published, with the road map aligning all 98 of its recommendations into four distinct 
routes as depicted in Figure 3. The graphic illustrates that making impactful changes in the 
four identified founding principles will converge and enable the acquisition workforce to 
quickly adapt to a changing global environment. 
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Figure 3. Section 809 Panel’s Roadmap to Success. Source: DTIC (n.d.). 
1. 809 Panel Recommendations 
Part 1, Section 5 of Volume 3 of 3 of the Section 809 Panel report outlined three 
acquisition workforce recommendations made by the Panel which centers on the creation 
of mission-focused business leaders as the whole person concept of professional 
accreditation and career progression, competency standards for the acquisition workforce 
and a public–private exchange program (PPEP). A PPEP will help the DoD acquisition 
workforce better understand the private sector (seller) acquisition processes (DTIC, n.d.). 
Below is a summarization of the three acquisition workforce recommendations as stated in 
the Panel’s report: 
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• Recommendation 59: Revise the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act to focus more on building professional qualifications 
- DoD’s implementation of DAWIA needs to be overhauled to introduce 
professional qualifications (demonstrated occupational competencies 
and proficiencies) in addition to certifications (an Acquisition Workforce 
(AWF) member’s education, training and experiences). Developing a 
highly qualified AWF requires a career development model that 
continuously deepens and broadens DoD AWF members’ experience 
throughout their careers. 
• Recommendation 60: Implement acquisition career paths that are 
integrated with an institutionalized competency model tailored to 
mission needs - DoD should implement career paths that cultivate and 
develop key work experience. These paths should be integrated with a 
competency model that features technical and nontechnical skills along 
with associated proficiency standards for every acquisition career field. 
A robust and dynamic career development model would provide clarity 
on the competencies and qualifications AWF members require to reach 
their full potential and contribute to optimal mission outcomes. 
• Recommendation 61: Create a comprehensive public–private exchange 
program for DoD’s acquisition workforce - PPEPs enjoy widespread 
support by DoD and Congress. Efforts to implement a comprehensive, 
two-way exchange program have failed due to structural and cultural 
factors that have created disincentives for DoD employing offices, DoD 
employees, and private-sector companies. Eliminating these 
disincentives would provide a foundation for a comprehensive exchange 
program. (DTIC, 809 Panel Roadmap, 2019, p. 16) 
As demand increases for faster and more efficient acquisition processes, the 
acquisition workforce will need to respond and be prepared to be flexible and open to 
reform and transformation. This mission-focused workforce needs to be prepared and have 
the competencies, skills and experience required to succeed in keeping the warfighter 
relevant in the global environment. 
2. Implementation 
The focus of this analysis concerns itself with the Enabling the Workforce, the third 
lane of the Panel’s roadmap depicted in Figure 3, specifically reforming workforce 
development. Workforce development reform is outlined in Recommendation 59 of the 
Panel’s report. It recommends DoD overhaul DAWIA to include competencies and 
proficiencies in the training process as well as workforce education-levels and gained skills 
and knowledge (DTIC, 2019a). Further expanding on the intricacies of Recommendation 
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59, the Panel addressed the problem the Panel was trying to solve concerning qualification 
of acquisition professionals. The Panel’s report stated: 
Provisions in DAWIA are intended to professionalize the DoD AWF by 
establishing specific requirements for education, training, and experience. 
After nearly 30 years, DoD is still attempting to use a certification structure 
that includes a greater emphasis on experience and ensuring AWF members 
attain necessary qualifications to fulfill their responsibilities. A current 
problem is that DoD’s certification programs create a sense among the AWF 
that professional development occurs in a finite period at the beginning of 
members’ careers rather than being a continuing process. Congress and DoD 
should revise DAWIA to focus on building a professional AWF qualified to 
tackle the challenges of the 21st century and beyond. Such a refocus would 
comprise substantiating qualifications and a modernization of the 
certification process. (DTIC, 809 Panel Vol 3 of 3, 2019, p. 493) 
To address this problem statement, the Panel interviewed subject matter experts in 
a variety of acquisition positions in both the public and private sector. Not only did the 
Panel conduct interviews, it also reviewed current certification standards, available formal 
training, GAO reports, and published guidance on workforce development to formulate its 
recommendations. (DTIC, 2019a). As stated in the 2019 809 Panel Report, 
The DoD Acquisition Workforce Strategic Plan sets a goal of prioritizing 
experiential learning through and relied on certification training completion 
as a measure of success with regard to DAWIA. DoD lacks metrics to 
measure improving workforce proficiency and capability. DoD senior leaders 
indicated that certification means nothing without an understanding of true 
capabilities. (p. 499) 
The Panel pointed out that 
Under the current construct, interns and new AWF employees are fully 
certified and considered experts in their field by merely remaining employed 
in a DoD acquisition organization for 4 years, along with the education and 
training for certification without having to demonstrate that they have 
mastered the proficiencies of an expert acquisition professional. Certification 
Level III should indicate AWF members have achieved initial readiness, not 
certified expertise. (p. 499) 
Once DAWIA certification is received there is no further requirement to recertify 
even though a change of statutes and regulations and best practices may have evolved with 
the change in acquisition environment, However, DoD does require the acquisition 
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workforce to earn 80 continuous learning points every two years to retain certification. The 
Panel pointed out that “both the government AWF and industry recognize the DAWIA 
construct as a well-developed certification program. It serves as a model for federal civilian 
agencies’ acquisition workforce and industry. However, there are no universal certification 
standards” (DTIC, 809 Panel Vol 3 of 3, 2019, p. 500). 
3. 809 Panel Recommendations to Congress 
As a result of the Panel’s gained insight, it recommended Congress amend 10 
U.S.C. § 1701a, Management for Acquisition Workforce Excellence, to: 
• Require DoD to implement an AWF professional certification program 
based on third-party accredited, nationally or internationally recognized 
standards for each DoD acquisition career field. 
• If a third-party accredited, nationally or internationally recognized 
certification program does not exist for a DoD acquisition career field, 
require DoD to establish a certification program using the best approach 
determined by the Secretary of Defense for meeting the requirement 
including implementation through entities outside DoD. (DTIC, 809 
Panel Vol 3 of 3, 2019, p. 284) 
The Section 809 Panel recommendations are the origins of implementing a third-
party accredited acquisition professional standard. In the next section, we’ll discuss how 
this recommendation is codified into law through the National Defense Authorization 
Act. 
D. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 
According to the 2020 Congressional Research Service Report on the NDAA 
process “the FY2020 NDAA is the 59th consecutive year for which an annual defense 
authorization was enacted” (p. 1). The reports states, “The NDAA does not provide budget 
authority for government activities” (p. 1).  Instead, the NDAA “establishes defense 
policies and restrictions, and addresses organizational administrative matters related to the 
DOD” (Williams, 2020, p. 1). 
The FY 2020 NDAA included language that emanated from the 809 Panel 
recommended amendment to 10 U.S.C. § 1701a, Management for Acquisition Workforce 
Excellence. Paragraph C under 10 USC § 1701a. was added (NDAA, 2020). 
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(c) PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATION. – (1) IN GENERAL. – The 
Secretary of Defense shall implement a certification program to provide for 
a professional certification requirement for all members of the acquisition 
workforce. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the certification requirement 
for any acquisition workforce career field shall be based on standards 
developed by a third-party accredited program based on nationally or 
internationally recognized standards. (2) REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SECRETARY—If the Secretary determines that, for a particular acquisition 
workforce career field, a third-party accredited program based on nationally 
or internationally recognized standards does not exist, the Secretary shall 
establish the certification requirement for that career field that conforms with 
the practices of national or international accrediting organizations. The 
Secretary shall determine the best approach for meeting the certification 
requirement for any such career field, including by implementing such 
certification requirement through entities outside the Department of Defense, 
and may design and implement such certification requirement without regard 
to section 1746 of this title. (pp. 319-320) 
NDAA FY20 added a Section 1765 to Title 10 USC Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 87, 
Subchapter V. This added section outlines mandate to the Secretary of Defense relating to 
acquisition workforce competency development –  
§ 1765. Competency development for each acquisition workforce career 
field, the Secretary of Defense shall – (1) establish, for the civilian personnel 
in that career field, defined proficiency standards and technical and 
nontechnical competencies which shall be used in personnel qualification 
assessments; and (2) assign resources to accomplish such technical and 
nontechnical competencies. The table of sections at the beginning of such 
subchapter II is amended by adding at the end the following new item: 1765. 
Competency development; (3) DEADLINE FOR IMPLEMENTATION. – 
Not later than the end of the two-year period beginning on the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall carry out the 
requirements of section 1765 of title 10, United States Code (as added by 
paragraph (1)). (j). (NDAA, 2020, p. 323) 
This mandate directs the Secretary of Defense to implement a national or 
international third-party accredited proficiency competency development program for all 
acquisition workforce members no later than 19 December 2021, which is two years from 
the 19 December 2019 enactment of this NDAA. 
In the next section, we’ll discuss further research which supports the 
implementation of a third-party accredited contract management competency. 
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E. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT COMPETENCY 
In Rendon’s 2010 paper titled Professionalization of the U.S. Defense Acquisition 
Workforce: Progress, Problems and Future Directions, he stated that Under Secretary of 
Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) implemented a Contracting 
Competency Assessment to establish a DoD contracting workforce capability baseline. 
According to Rendon, this baseline current competencies of the acquisition workforce as 
well as identify gaps in skills and knowledge. This information could then be used to 
identify areas for increased workforce skill progression (Rendon, 2010). Acquisition 
workforce competency has been a GAO focal point for over a decade and several reports 
have been issued on the subject. The next section will review a 2015 GAO report, which 
discussed the need to improve workforce capability. This is followed by a review of the 
FY 2010 NDAA, highlighting the ongoing issue of competency assessment and how it can 
be effectively addressed.  
1. GAO Report 16-80 
In December 2015, the GAO released report GAO-16-80 – Defense Acquisition 
Workforce: Actions Needed to Guide Planning Efforts and Improve Workforce Capability. 
In the background section of this GAO report DiNapoli states, “since 2001, GAO has 
included strategic human capital management as a government high-risk area” (DiNapoli, 
2015, p. 4).  Earlier in 2015, the GAO released its High-Risk Series: An Update, by Mihm, 
(GAO-15-290), that reported “DOD has demonstrated sustained leadership commitment to 
address its acquisition workforce challenges, underscored by the department’s emphasis 
on growing and training the acquisition workforce through its Better Buying Power 
initiatives” (Mihm, 2015, p. 4). 
GAO-16-80 also reported that the GAO and Office of Personnel Management 
identified six strategic areas where organizations should incorporate into workforce 
development.  
According to the 16-80 GAO report DiNapoli ventures into addressing the limited 
data pertaining to workforce proficiency and skill gaps. It states: 
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Increasing the number of people performing acquisition work is only part of 
DOD’s strategy to improve the capability of its workforce; another part is 
ensuring that the workforce has the requisite skills and tools to perform their 
tasks. DOD developed a five-phased process that included surveys of its 
employees to assess the skills of its workforce and to identify and close skill 
gaps. Efforts to complete the process were hindered by low survey response 
rates and the absence of proficiency standards. Further, DOD has not 
established time frames for when career fields should conduct another round 
of competency assessments to assess progress towards addressing previously 
identified gaps and to identify emerging needs. (p. 16) 
2. NDAA 2010 
Included in the 16-80 GAO report from the Fiscal Year 2010 NDAA, Section 1108 
required DoD to report on its plan for the acquisition workforce addressing critical skills 
and competencies needed by future acquisition workforce members, this plan is to cover a 
seven-year period. The DoD is also to include in this report any acquisition workforce skill 
and proficiency gaps to ensure they are prepared to meet the needs of the DoD (DiNapoli, 
2015). 
Encompassed in the 16-80 GAO report was the five-step model from the 2010 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Strategy to assess acquisition workforce 
skills and identify skill gaps and monitor progress for closing those skill gaps as identified 
in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Five-Step Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Strategy. 
Source: DiNapoli (2015). 
Figure 4 captures GAO’s view on the need for competencies for the acquisition 
workforce and highlights the length of time its focus has been on the acquisition 
workforce’s knowledge and skills. The next section provides an overview of the Office of 
23 
Personnel Management’s competency definition and tools to identify competencies and 
critical tasks for federal occupational series. 
F. COMPETENCIES AND THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
The Assessment and Selection section of the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) website defines competency as “a measurable pattern of knowledge, skills, abilities, 
behaviors, and other characteristics that an individual needs to perform work roles or 
occupational functions successfully. Competencies specify the ‘how’ of performing job 
tasks, or what the person needs to do the job successfully” (OPM, n.d). According to OPM, 
when conducting an analysis of competency gaps, it “involves two primary components: 
(1) the selection of competencies to assess, and (2) the identification of current proficiency 
gaps in incumbents’ ability to apply these competencies during job performance” (OPM, 
n.d). Competency gaps are “presented in a survey to job incumbents and supervisors for 
ratings of current and required proficiency levels” (OPM, n.d). 
For more than 20 years, OPM has utilized the Multipurpose Occupational Systems 
Analysis Inventory - Close-Ended (MOSAIC) method. According to OPM, MOSAIC is a 
“survey-based occupational analysis approach, used to collect information from 
incumbents and supervisors on many occupations for a wide range of human resource 
management functions” (OPM, n.d.). According to OPM, it has used MOSAIC to identify 
competencies and critical tasks for nearly 200 federal occupational series. As described on 
the OPM website, the MOSAIC competency definition for Contracting/Procurement is: 
“Knowledge of various types of contracts, techniques, or requirements (for example, 
Federal Acquisitions Regulations) for contracting or procurement, and contract negotiation 
and administration” (OPM, n.d.). 
The next section discusses the DoD competency-based model developed during 
then Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Dr. Shay Assad’s tenure at 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics). The 
DoD Contracting Competency-Based Model is the current model used by the Air Force to 
assess and certify contracting workforce competencies. 
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G. DOD CONTRACTING COMPETENCY-BASED MODEL 
A DoD competency model was developed in 2007 to conduct a contracting 
competency assessment to baseline the knowledge, skills and abilities of the entirety of the 
DoD contracting workforce (DPAP, 2020a). Assessment results were to provide the DoD 
an inventory of current workforce competencies. According to the DoD-Wide Contracting 
Competency Assessment Fact Sheet, the assessment results will be used to “provide a 
complete inventory of competencies which exist in the DoD-wide Contracting workforce; 
identify current and projected competency gaps; and support workforce development in 
ways to best fit the strengths and weaknesses of the workforce and the needs of the 
contracting mission” (DPAP Contracting Competency Assessment, 2020b). The 
assessment was comprised of eleven units: ten technical units and one professional unit 
that included ten sub-units. A respondent’s proficiency score was then tallied based on the 
level of knowledge and competence in the rated areas. Figure 5 depicts the eleven 
competency units, identified in the Competency-based Management for the DoD-wide 
Contracting Community overview brief, dated March 2008. 
 
Figure 5. DoD Contracting Competency Units. Source: DPAP (2020b). 
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Figure 6 depicts information from this same presentation that outlined the 
assessment methodology for capturing the frequency, proficiency and criticality for each 
of the assessed competencies. 
 
Figure 6. DoD Acquisition Competency Assessment. Source: DPAP 
(2020b). 
As stated on DPAP website, these proficiency scores were then “compared to one 
of six mission area proficiency standards to determine competency gaps across the DoD-
wide Contracting Workforce” (DPAP, 2020a). The six mission areas are identified on Slide 
10: Major Systems, Logistics and Sustainment, Base Operations, Defense Agencies and 
Research Labs, Construction/Architecture and Engineering and Contracting in a 
Contingency and/or Combat Environment. Each of the mission areas proficiency standards 
will be “compared at the entry, journey, or senior level to determine competency gaps 
across the DoD-wide Contracting Workforce: Frequency and criticality data will be used 
to analyze/prioritize competency gaps such that workforce development efforts may focus 
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on needs of the contracting mission” (DPAP, 2020a). The assessment was launched as a 
four-phase approach starting in June 2007 and ended in May 2008. According to the 2014 
Office of the Under Secretary of the of Defense, competency assessment kickoff memo the 
past assessment experienced a 90% participation rate (DPAP, 2020a). 
In April 2014, a second contracting workforce competency assessment was 
launched utilizing the same model and methodology used in the past inventory. No public 
information on the results was found on either inventory assessment.  
Today, the DoD bases its training for the contracting workforce on the DoD 
Competency framework discussed in this section. However, the DoD framework is not 
currently a third-party accredited competency framework. In light of the recent legislation 
previously discussed in this chapter, moving toward a third-party accredited framework is 
necessary.  
In response to NDAA 2020, Section 861, a recently published memorandum signed 
by the acting Principal Director of Defense Pricing and Contracting, calls for the 
Department to begin using the NCMA CMBOK CMS as the competency framework for 
DoD (B. Schwartz, email to author, May 8, 2020). This was based on recommendations 
from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Human Capital Initiatives (HCI) 
taskforce, which recommended the CMS to the Senior Procurement Executives (SPEs) on 
April 03, 2020. The memo states, “the approved recommendations are a new Contracting 
Competency Model and a redesigned contracting talent development structure, comprised 
of a single level of certification and a comprehensive examination on the contracting 
common competencies” (B. Schwartz, email to author, May 8, 2020). The SPEs approved 
the recommendation recognizing the CMS model complies with section 861 of the FY2020 
NDAA, requiring professional certification of the workforce be developed from a third-
party accredited program. 
As discussed above, the FY2020 NDAA mandated any DoD acquisition workforce 
competency framework adopted or created must be accredited by a third-party. While there 
are many methods for accreditation of business and proficiency standards, the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI) is recognized both nationally and internationally as a 
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standards accreditation body. The next section reviews this nationally recognized third-
party accreditation body. 
H. AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE 
As the United States’ participant in the International Standards Organization (ISO), 
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) operates as an independent third-party 
national and international standards accreditation body. ANSI’s website states its mission 
is to “enhance both the global competitiveness of U.S. business and the U.S. quality of life 
by promoting and facilitating voluntary consensus standards and conformity assessment 
systems, and safeguarding their integrity” (ANSI, n.d.). As listed on the ANSI website, 
since ANSI’s inception in 1918 the organization has been “dedicated to supporting the U.S. 
voluntary standards and conformity assessment system and strengthening its impact, both 
domestically and internationally” (ANSI, n.d.). According to the ANSI literature, these 
standards encompass “practically every industry, the Institute represents the diverse 
interests of more than 270,000 companies and organizations, and 30 million professionals 
worldwide” (ANSI, n.d.). 
Also stated on the ANSI website, in the National Standards Overview section, 
“ANSI facilitates the development of American National Standards (ANS) by accrediting 
the procedures of standards developing organizations. These groups work cooperatively to 
develop voluntary national consensus standards” (ANSI, n.d.). The overview goes on to 
describe that “accreditation by ANSI signifies that the procedures used by the standards 
body in connection with the development of American National Standards meet the 
Institute’s essential requirements for openness, balance, consensus and due process” 
(ANSI, n.d.). 
ANSI works as a facilitator for “the development of ANS by accrediting the 
procedures of standards developing organizations (SDOs). These groups work 
cooperatively to develop voluntary national consensus standards” (ANSI, n.d.). For a 
standard to maintain “ANSI accreditation, standards developers are required to consistently 
adhere to a set of requirements or procedures known as the ‘ANSI Essential Requirements’, 
that govern the consensus development process” (ANSI, n.d.). The ANSI process includes: 
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• consensus on a proposed standard by a group or "consensus body" that 
includes representatives from materially affected and interested parties; 
• broad-based public review and comment on draft standards; 
• consideration of and response to comments submitted by voting 
members of the relevant consensus body and by public review 
commenters; 
• incorporation of approved changes into a draft standard; and 
• right to appeal by any participant that believes that due process principles 
were not sufficiently respected during the standards development in 
accordance with the ANSI-accredited procedures of the standards 
developer. (ANSI, n.d.) 
An ANSI standard is defined as “[a] document, established by consensus, that 
provides rules, guidelines, or characteristics for activities or their results” (ANSI, n.d.). 
According to the NCMA website, “ANSI contends that the common and repeated use of a 
standard will improve productivity, increase efficiency, and reduce costs” (CMS, 2019). 
As previously stated, the CMBOK CMS is accredited by ANSI. In the next section, 
we will review the contract management process and the CMBOK CMS. 
I. THE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT STANDARD (CMS)  
The NCMA created a framework known as the Contract Management Body of 
Knowledge (CMBOK) in September 2002. The CMBOK is a professional standard created 
for the contract management workforce. The NCMA was founded in 1959 to promote 
contract management through education and professional certifications. Today, NCMA’s 
three professional certifications are rooted in the CMS. The CMS is an ANSI-accredited 
standard that defines the contract management process by job tasks and skills. As stated on 
the NCMA website,  
The CMS has five purposes: 1) to define and standardize the term contract 
management; 2) to present and define the processes in the contract life cycle; 
3) to develop and perfect contract management practices, policies and 
procedures; 4) to inspire critical thinking and learning to bring efficiency to 
the contract management profession and; 5) to be a constantly-evolving or 
“living” document with a formal change process. (CMS, 2019) 
The CMS is a creditable framework for all contract management processes. 
According to the CMS website, in April 2019, ANSI completed the accreditation of 
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NCMA’s CMS (CMS, 2019). The purpose of this standard and the key to the accreditation 
is stability and a repeatable, standardized process (NCMA, n.d.). The terminology, 
processes and policies will vary greatly from organization to organization as discussed later 
in Chapter IV. However as described on the NCMA website, by providing one framework 
of common job tasks and competencies, the CMBOK CMS is a valuable tool for contract 
management, written without bias for internal policies, presented in processes that are 
“intuitive and predictable” for all (NCMA, n.d.). Additionally, when all contract managers 
are speaking one language consistently, there is a higher probability of reaching an 
understanding on contract intent and interpretation. This is a win-win for DoD and all 
sellers that do business with the DoD. 
The CMS competencies are presented using the contract management life cycle 
(i.e., pre-award, award, and post-award) from the CMBOK (CMS, 2019). The CMBOK 
CMS can be accessed from the NCMA website under the Standards and Certification tab 
(NCMA, n.d.). CMBOK provides a complete overview of the profession and includes not 
only the competencies in the CMS, but also leadership, management and learning (NCMA, 
n.d.). The phases are divided by domains and subdomains along the pre-award, award, and 
post-award life cycles as shown in Figure 7. A discussion of the life cycle phases, as well 
explanation of the domains and competencies, follows Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.  The Contract Management Standard Publication. 
Source: NCMA (n.d.). 
1. Pre-Award Phase 
According to the CMS shown in Figure 7, the pre-award phase consists of activities 
for the buyer of developing the requirement, determining a suitable acquisition strategy, 
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and developing a plan for evaluation of the seller’s offer (CMS, 2019). For the seller, pre-
award activities are similar including, market research, response to requests for information 
from the buyer, and developing a strategy to obtain an award. For both buyers and sellers, 
this phase relies heavily on market research. The two domains under Pre-Award are 
developing the solicitation and developing the offer. Developing the solicitation is a pre-
award activity for the buyers. The key competencies are developing a requirement, 
performing a meaningful risk analysis, market research, and formulating the acquisition 
strategy. After these steps are completed the buyer requests offers. They execute the 
acquisition or solicitation plan, respond to sellers’ questions and amend solicitations if 
necessary (CMS, 2019). 
The CMS also points out that developing an offer is in the domain of the seller. 
(CMS, 2019). This is a value-added process for the seller as it is based on the offeror’s 
business strategy which increases the seller’s competitive position in the market. When 
developing an offer, the key competencies for sellers are to assess competition, scan the 
market for opportunities and threats, and develop customer relations and sales strategies. 
This is called planning sales. Finally, the seller will prepare an offer to the solicitation with 
the intent on winning the business for their company (CMS, 2019). 
2. Award Phase 
As shown in the CMS (Figure 7), the second phase in the contract management life 
cycle is the award phase (CMS, 2019). This phase encompasses all the work buyers and 
sellers perform to award or win a contract depending on their roles. Buyers award contracts 
to sellers and sellers win or receive contracts from buyers. There is only one domain in this 
phase; to form the contract. In the award phase, the buyer competencies are evaluating 
offers, conducting negotiations, selecting the source, awarding a contract, debriefings and 
addressing any mistakes or misunderstandings in the selection process the seller may have. 
For sellers the competencies in this phase will include, clarifying the offer, participating in 
the negotiations and preparing the final offer. In order to develop or form a contract, the 
buyer must also determine price and costs are reasonable, select the source and manage 
any disagreements (CMS, 2019). 
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3. Post-Award Phase 
According to the CMS as shown in Figure 7, when the award has been made and 
the debriefings have been completed, the post-award life cycle phase begins (CMS, 2019). 
Contract performance begins in the post-award phase. Again, buyers and sellers both have 
key roles in the contract management post-award phase. The competencies under this phase 
for the buyer are addressing performance issues and identifying performance risk, 
executing contract changes or modifications, monitoring compliance with contract terms 
and conditions, processing invoices for payment, and closing out the contract once 
performance has ended. The seller competencies are contract performance, subcontracting 
activities, managing contract changes, invoicing, and bringing the contract to a successful 
conclusion. The two domains under post-award phase are Perform Contract and Close 
Contract. Managing risk and maintaining open lines of communication for both the buyer 
and seller are critical to a successful post-award phase. Once the contract is complete, the 
buyer and seller will verify all the requirements of the contract have been met, settle any 
unresolved issues, reconcile and make the final payment (CMS, 2019). 
The CMS is not the only model the DoD can use to assess competency, but using 
it to identify contract management issues is an effective internal control as well. It will 
allow the Air Force to meet the objective of developing mission-focused business leaders 
because it addresses both the buyer and seller objectives.  
In recent research comparing the NCMA CMBOK/CMS with the contracting 
competency models used by the DoD, Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI), and the National 
Institute for Government Purchasing (NIGP), Rendon found that the NCMA 
CMBOK/CMS competency model provides a better approach for developing the DoD 
contracting workforce. He further suggests that expanding the DoD contracting 
workforce’s knowledge to include the seller’s competencies will help in developing 
contract management skills that transfer across government and industry, as well as 





In this chapter, we reviewed the literature associated with contracting workforce 
competencies. We began with an overview of auditability theory and its three key aspects. 
Next, we reviewed how both the Section 809 Panel and the FY 2020 NDAA played an 
integral role in reforming regulations and statutes to enhance the effectiveness of the 
contracting workforce. Specifically, the FY2020 NDAA calls for use of a third-party 
accredited competency model. We also reviewed the current DoD competency model, 
which is the current baseline for the knowledge, skills, and abilities for the entirety of the 
DoD contracting workforce. Next, we reviewed ANSI as a qualified third-party 
accreditation source. We provided an overview of the NCMA CMBOK Contract 
Management Standard Publication, which has been accredited by ANSI; thus, linking a 
third-party accredited standard to meet the intent of the NDAA language. 
In Chapter III, we discuss how Air Force contracting leadership is looking to 
improve the contracting workforce as mission-focused business leaders. We will also 
provide a summary of each of the Air Force organizations aligned to this research; Air 
Force Acquisition and Management and Integration Center (AMIC), Air Force Nuclear 
Weapons Center (AFNWC) and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). 
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III. AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED 
IN THE RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Our research analyzes deficiencies from previous DoD IG reports and provides an 
assessment of the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist, found in AFFARS MP 
5301.601-91 in comparison to the NCMA CMBOK CMS. This chapter first discusses how 
Air Force Contracting leadership is developing lines of effort to grow the Air Force 
acquisition workforce. Specifically, we discuss how our research is relevant to the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary (Contracting) (SAF/AQC) Air Force Contracting Flight Plan, Line of 
Effort #1.  This line of effort is Air Force contracting’s goal to develop mission-focused 
business leaders (Air Force [AF] Contracting, Flight Plan, 2019, access restricted to AF 
personnel, retrieved from internal server, March 11, 2020). This means that Air Force 
contracting workforce will need to have the competencies that encompass both buyers and 
sellers. Line of Effort #1 also aligns back to the auditability triangle for competent 
personnel. Since this research is solely focused on Air Force discrepancies and the 
auditability of competent personnel and internal controls for the Air Force, we have 
provided an overview Air Force Contracting as well as a discussion of the mission, 
organizational structure, and acquisition data for three organizational contracting activities 
under Air Force Contracting. 
B. AIR FORCE CONTRACTING 
“The mission of the Air Force is to fly, fight and win in air, space and cyberspace” 
(DAF, 2019). The mission of Air Force Contracting (SAF/AQC) is exactly the same. The 
vision of SAF/AQC is to create “mission-focused business leaders driving modernization, 
readiness and lethality” for the Air Force (SAF AQC, n.d.). To execute this strategic vision, 
Major General Cameron Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting, created a Board 
of Directors, which is a governance structure of Air Force senior contracting leaders. In his 
The Contracting Experience (TCE) Podcast Episode 10, Major General Holt explains the 
purpose of this governing body. He makes clear in the podcast, that the purpose of the 
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Board of Directors is 1) transparency; 2) improve representation of the contracting 
workforce; 3) simplify for understanding what it means to be a leader in Air Force 
contracting and give junior members of the career field a clear vision of their future role as 
leaders; and finally, 4) by naming it the Board of Directors, this provides emphasis as to 
contracting leaders roles as business leaders for the Air Force (Holt TCE Podcast Episode 
10, 2019, 5:18). Major General Holt wants all Air Force contracting professionals to 
embrace this role of mission-focused business leaders. As part of his Strategic Flight Plan 
released in 2019, he formally changed the focus from business advisor to mission-focused 
business leaders (Holt TCE Podcast, 2019; AF Flight Plan, 2019). 
1. Line of Effort 
Scott Kiser, Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary of Contracting, gives further 
details in The Contracting Experience Podcast Episode 10, on what a mission-focused 
business leadership means to the Air Force contracting workforce. Mr. Kiser explains, 
“Contracting has a direct role in each of the three predominant lines of effort outlined in 
the National Defense Strategy. First, to build a more lethal force, by increasing lethality 
and readiness. Second, strengthen alliances and attracting new partners [to the Air Force] 
and finally, to reform DoD business practices for greater performance and affordability” 
(Holt TCE Podcast Episode 10; 6:12, 2019). The SAF/AQC Strategic Flight Plan (AF 
Flight Plan, 2019) has a direct correlation to these three key areas in the National Defense 
Strategy and is designed with four objective Lines of Effort. 
• Line of Effort 1: Building Mission-Focused Business Leaders 
• Line of Effort 2: Tools Not Rules! 
• Line of Effort 3: Owning the High Ground: Optimizing the Acquisition 
Enterprise 
• Line of Effort 4: Expeditionary Contracting as a Joint Force Capability 
(AF Flight Plan, 2019, p. 6) 
This discussion will focus on Line of Effort 1 as it directly aligns to our research. 
Tom Robinson, Director for Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Contracting 
Directorate, is the champion for this Line of Effort. In summarizing this line of effort, the 
Air Force Contracting Flight Plan states, “One of our primary focus areas that will affect 
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both recruiting and retention is a renewed emphasis on a culture of mission-focus and 
lifelong learning and development” (AF Flight Plan, 2019, p 7). 
(1) Objective 1:  Attract, access and retain key talent 
Objective 1 states, “The bedrock of a professional contracting workforce is talented 
individuals” (AF Flight Plan, 2019, p. 7). There are several key points in Objective 1 
including showcasing the Air Force as a great career opportunity, attracting the best talent 
not only from within the Department but also from industry, working with Air Force 
personnel office to improve hiring authorities, and working toward increased pay and 
increased authority and responsibility for the contracting workforce (AF Flight Plan, 2019). 
(2) Objective 2:  Reimagine training and culture from initial skills through 
executive level 
Objective 2 is designed to “evaluate and improve training and development tracks.” 
(AF Flight Plan, 2019, p. 7) The goal is to provide create a consistent career training plan 
with feedback as well as promoting growth past the DAWIA Acquisition Professional 
Development Program Level III certification and an unlimited Contracting Officer warrant 
level. The Air Force has identified a gap in training between the Level III and increased 
responsibility as a Senior Contracting Official (SCO). This ties directly back to Major 
General Holt’s vision for the Air Force Contracting Board of Directors and aligns perfectly 
with our research (AF Flight Plan, 2019). 
(3) Objective 3:  Leverage and formalize key strategic external partnerships 
Objective 3 is to evaluate strategic partnerships with external organizations, then 
develop long-term partnerships that can help advance the Air Force mission. Through 
understanding of industry acquisition processes and using models that encompass both 
buyer and seller activities, these partnerships will be validated and more useful to meeting 
mission needs. This objective also directly aligns with our research (AF Flight Plan, 2019). 
2. Call to Action 
Maj Gen Holt’s flight plan is a call to action and to take calculated risks as business 
leaders do. In the introduction of the Air Force Contracting Flight Plan, he concludes by stating:  
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Today, we find ourselves at a crossroads. As identified in the National 
Defense Strategy, the United States is returning to an era of Great Power 
Competition and the stakes could not be higher. We do not have the luxury 
to wait for decade-long acquisition cycles or passive engagement in 
procurement decisions. The Air Force, now more than ever, needs Mission-
Focused Business Leaders who can employ the full spectrum of Government 
contracting tools. Yet that is not enough! The Air Force’s Business Leaders 
also must become more knowledgeable about US industry capabilities, 
capital markets and business process innovations related to air, space, cyber 
and full-spectrum readiness. (AF Flight Plan, 2019, p. 3) 
By utilizing the NCMA CMBOK CMS as a model for contract management 
processes, Air Force contracting professionals can and will be more mission-focused 
business leaders. 
In the next section, we provide a summary of three Air Force organizations and 
their missions. These organizations provide a good cross-section of the different types of 
Air Force contracting mission sets, from services acquisitions, systems, and research and 
development. 
C. OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR COMMANDS OF THE ORGANIZATIONS 
HIGHLIGHTED IN THIS RESEARCH 
1. Air Combat Command 
The Acquisition Management and Integration Center (AMIC) is aligned under Air 
Combat Command (ACC). According to the AMIC website ACC is, “the largest of the Air 
Force’s Major Commands” (AMIC, n.d.). ACC is headquartered at Joint Base Langley-
Eustis, Virginia. According to the ACC website the mission is:  
To support global implementation of national security strategy, ACC operates 
fighter, reconnaissance, battle-management and electronic-combat aircraft. It 
also provides command, control, communications and intelligence systems, 
and conducts global information operations. As the Combat Air Forces lead 
agent, ACC develops strategy, doctrine, concepts, tactics, and procedures for 
air-, space-, and cyber-power employment. The command can also be called 
upon to assist national agencies with intelligence, surveillance and crisis 
response capabilities. (ACC, 2013) 
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2. Air Force Material Command 
The Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center and Air Force Research Laboratory are 
aligned under the Air Force Material Command (AFMC, 2018). AFMC is headquartered 
at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio and “conducts research, development, test and 
evaluation, and provides acquisition management services and logistics support necessary 
to keep Air Force weapon systems ready for war” (AFMC, 2018). The Command “fulfills 
its mission of equipping the Air Force with the best weapon systems through the Air Force 
Research Laboratory and several unique centers which are responsible for the ‘cradle-to-
grave’ oversight for aircraft, electronic systems, missiles and munitions” (AFMC, 2018). 
D. OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONS HIGHLIGHTED IN THIS 
RESEARCH  
1. Acquisition Management and Integration Center Overview 
Headquarters (HQ) Air Combat Command (ACC) Acquisition Management and 
Integration Center (AMIC) is a unique services acquisition organization located at Langley 
AFB, Virginia. In 2007, the merger of ACC’s contracting and program management 
squadrons were combined to create an integrated service acquisition center based on the 
center of excellence models for acquisition. According to the organization’s website, “The 
AMIC is unique where contracting officers and program managers work side-by-side 
developing acquisition solutions, while understanding the constraints of performance, cost, 
and schedule. It is an industry-like model which is conducive to meeting the warfighter’s 
mission needs. The catalyst behind this merger was to create an organization with cross-
functional/cross-directorate capability to service the command’s service acquisition needs. 
Since 2007, AMIC has grown and is recognized as a "center of excellence" for Air Force 
services acquisition management. According to AMIC’s website under the home section, 
AMIC’s mission is to “deliver responsive, cost-effective, mission-focused acquisition 
solutions to maximize operational capabilities” (AMIC, n.d.). Additionally, the center has 
over 430 personnel including contracting, program management, legal, financial & human 
resource management, communications, logistics, civil engineer and quality assurance 
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personnel supporting a $15B services acquisition portfolio for HQ ACC (AMIC, n.d.). The 
Director of HQ ACC AMIC is Mr. Timothy Applegate.  
Some of the benefits realized through this integrated model have been process-
oriented rather than functional task-oriented methodologies to requirements development. 
Additionally, the AMIC model maximizes resource availability by reducing functional 
competition and unlike many Air Force contracting squadrons, program managers provide 
data analytics for cost and spend rates across functional areas, resulting in a process to 
promote more efficient acquisition solutions. As an employee since 2008, my experience 
is through their model, AMIC has been able to reduce cycle times and maximize training 
efficiency by training a common skill set and language across functional areas. Finally, this 
model has AMIC professionals interacting with other organizations outside of ACC at the 
wing, combatant commanders and numbered Air Force to take advantage of synergies 
wherever possible. 
Figure 8 shows AMIC’s global footprint, multiple theaters and all the areas where 
AMIC is providing contracting and program management support. AMIC provides 
integrated acquisition support in six global commands, USNORTHCOM, 
USSOUTHCOM, USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM and USPACOM. In the 




Source: AMIC unpublished presentation slides, accessed from internal server, October 2, 
2010. 
Figure 8. AMIC Locations. 
According to internal AMIC records (S. Wagner, email to author, June 9, 2020). 
AMIC obligations were approximately $1.7B in FY19. AMIC primarily supports 
professional, administrative and management support services as well as operations, 
maintenance and repair of equipment [aircraft] and facilities for HQ ACC. Support for the 
flying mission of ACC is the backbone of the AMIC portfolio. In the next section, we will 
provide an overview of the Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center. 
2. Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center Overview 
The Air Force Nuclear Weapon Center (AFNWC) was established in 2006 as a 
Directorate within the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) (AFNWC, 2016). AFNWC 
assists both AFMC and Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) to preside over all 
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aspects of nuclear material management and to sustain and extend the life of the 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) fleet. The mission of AFNWC is to “Deliver 
nuclear capabilities Warfighters use every day to deter and assure” and their vision is to 
“ensure our nation’s most powerful weapon systems are never doubted, always feared” 
(AFNWC, 2016, p. 1). 
AFNWC’s headquarters is based at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico. Figure 
9 shows a snapshot of AFNWC’s locations. They employee over 1,300 people across 18 
different locations. The Organization is made up of four major directorates: NC3 
Integration Directorate (AFNWC/NC), Air Delivered Capabilities Directorate 
(AFNWC/ND), the ICBM systems Directorate (AFNWC/NI), and the Nuclear Technology 
and Interagency Directorate (AFWNC/NT) (AFNWC, 2016). 
 
Source: Lt. Col. R. Smith, e-mail to author, April 1, 2020. 
Figure 9. AFNWC Snapshot. 
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The contracting directorate that supports AFNWC is referred to as PZ/PK. Figure 
10 depicts the organizational structure for the contracting directorate as well as a summary 
of the manning. 
 
Source: Lt. Col. R. Smith, e-mail to author, April 1, 2020. 
Figure 10. AFNWC/PZ Organizational Chart. 
Overall, this contracting activity has a budget execution of over $22B on approximately 
33 programs (Peters et al., 2019). Because of the highly visible programs under this directorate, 
it is important that it is equipped with highly trained contracting business leaders. The next 
section provides an overview of the Air Force Research Laboratory. 
3. Air Force Research Laboratory Overview 
The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is headquartered at Wright Patterson 
Air Force Base, Ohio. AFRL is one of six Air Force Material Command centers and is 
tasked with the core mission area of discovery and development (AFRL, 2016). AFRL was 
created in October 1997 as a result of the consolidation of “four former Air Force 
laboratories and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research” (AFRL, 2016). AFRL’s 
44 
mission is to lead “the discovery, development and delivery of warfighting technologies 
for our air, space and cyberspace forces” (AFRL, 2016). According to the AFRL website, 
the laboratory maintains state of the art buildings and equipment that are specialized to 
meet the current and future demands for technology to support the warfighter and national 
defense (AFResearchlab, 2020). As described on AFRL website, the lab is comprised of 
nine Technology Directorates (TD), eleven Functional Directorates, 711th Human 
Performance Wing and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. Each TD focuses on 
“the development and innovations of AFRL and are separated by technological 
capabilities. The functional directorates provide specialized support, strategic direction and 
oversight of the operations and business functions” (AFResearchlab, 2020). 
According to the Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) webpage, “AFRL is the Air 
Force's only organization wholly dedicated to leading the discovery, development, and 
integration of warfighting technologies for our air, space and cyberspace forces. It traces 
its roots to the vision of airpower pioneers who understood science as key to air supremacy” 
(KAFB, n.d.). It goes on to state the vision of the past and present AFRL workforce “has 
helped create the world's best air, space and cyberspace force” (KAFB, n.d.). 
AFRL’s locations are shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. AFRL Locations. Source: AFRL Overview (n.d.). 
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter summarized the Air Force Contracting mission and objectives to 
develop mission-focused business leaders, under Line of Effort #1. We discussed 
organizational structure and mission for the three organizations we are each assigned to. 
These organizations also provide a good cross-section of the Air Force contracting mission. 
In the next chapter, we will compare Air Force contract management deficiencies found in 
data retrieved from several DoD IG reports to the CMS. We will also compare the Air 
Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist with the CMS to determine how both of these 
are aligned under the CMS competency framework. The analysis of the alignment of the 
reported deficiencies with the CMS competency framework may identify knowledge gaps 
in the contracting workforce and provide opportunities for additional training thus 
improving workforce competency. The analysis of the contracting self-inspection 
checklists will determine the extent that Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist 
items are aligned with the CMS competency areas and provide insight into the Air Force’s 
internal controls for auditability. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF DOD IG AND AIR FORCE CONTRACTING 
SELF-INSPECTION RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of an analysis of DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) 
identified deficiencies and categorizes these deficiencies into contract management process 
areas as found in the Contract Management Body of Knowledge’s (CMBOK) Contract 
Management Standards (CMS). This analysis focuses on Air Force-specific deficiencies to 
identify potential Air Force acquisition workforce competency and knowledge gaps 
compared to the CMS contract management competency model. In addition, a comparative 
analysis of how the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist aligns with the CMS 
was also completed. Currently, the Air Force utilizes self-inspection checklists as an 
approach for internal controls within their contracting organizations. 
B. SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTED 
1. DoD IG Audit Report Deficiencies 
The source data for this analysis originated from DoD IG audit reports released 
between 2003 through 2010. This information was sourced from Table 1 of a previously 
published thesis titled, An Analysis of Internal Controls for DoD Contract Management 
(Hidaka & Owen, 2015). For purposes of this research, Table 1 was created to capture only 
deficiencies applicable to the Air Force from the Hidaka and Owen research (2015). Three 





















Key Practice Activities 
Air Force # of 
Deficiencies 
Air Force % of 
Deficiencies 
1
PP-1 Requirements Analysis 5 3.8%
PP-2 Required Sources of Supply and Services 1 0.8%
PP-3 Acquisition Planning 15 11.5%
PP-4 Market Research 5 3.8%
PP-5 Determine Competition Environment 4 3.1%
Sub Total of Procurement Planning 30 22.9%
2
SP-1 Document Competition Environment 0 0.0%
SP-2 Determine Procurement Method 3 2.3%
SP-3 Determine Evaluation Strategy 7 5.3%
SP-4 Develop Solicitation Documents 2 1.5%
SP-5 Determine Contract Type/ Incentive 9 6.9%
SP-6 Determine Terms and Conditions 3 2.3%
Sub Total of Solicitation Planning 24 18.3%
3
S-1 Advertise Procurement Activities 2 1.5%
S-2 Conduct Conference 1 0.8%
S-3 Amend solicitation documents as required 4 3.1%
Sub Total of Solicitation 7 5.3%
4
SS-1 Evaluate Proposals 6 4.6%
SS-2 Apply Evaluation Criteria 7 5.3%
SS-3 Negotiate Contract Terms and Conditions 8 6.1%
SS-4 Contractor Responsibility Standards 4 3.1%
SS-5 Select Contractor 0 0.0%
SS-6 Manage Protests, Disputes and Appeals 0 0.0%
Sub Total of Source Selection 25 19.1%
5
CA-1 Conduct conferences 0 0.0%
CA-2 Manage contract change process 3 2.3%
CA-3 Monitor contractor's management of subcontracting 2 1.5%
CA-4 Manage government furnished property 1 0.8%
CA-5 Monitor and measure contractor performance 11 8.4%
CA-6 Manage Transportation Issues 0 0.0%
CA-7 Manage Value Engineering Issues 0 0.0%
CA-8 Manage contractor payment process 7 5.3%
CA-9 Manage patents, data, copyright, bonds, insurance, taxes 0 0.0%
CA-10 Manage Protests, Disputes and Appeals 0 0.0%
CA-11 Comply with terms and conditions 18 13.7%
Sub Total of Contract Administration 42 32.1%
6
CCO-1 Verify contract completion 2 1.5%
CCO-2 Verify contractor compliance 1 0.8%
CCO-3 Ensure contract completion documentation 0 0.0%
CCO-4 Make final payment 0 0.0%
CCO-5 Document lessons learned/ best practices 0 0.0%
CCO-6 Process contract terminations, if applicable 0 0.0%
CCO-7 Dispose of buyer-furnished property and equipment 0 0.0%
CCO-8 Process contract closeout procedures 0 0.0%
Sub Total of Contract Closeout 3 2.3%
TOTAL OF ALL DEFICIENCIES 131 100.0%
Contract Closeout 







2. Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist 
The source of the data for this analysis is found in Air Force Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) Mandatory Procedure (MP) 5301.601-9. The Air Force 
Self Inspection Checklist, however, can only be accessed by Air Force personnel as it is 
housed on an internal server. (Air Force [AF], Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist, 
access restricted to AF personnel, retrieved from internal server, May 10, 2020). Three 
tables were created to cross-reference the alignment of the Air Force Contracting Self-
Inspection Checklist against the CMS competency model. This was done in order to 
determine what competency gaps are evident between the two. They are broken down by 
pre-award, award and post-award. However, we begin this section by discussing the 
analysis of the DoD IG deficiencies, followed by an analysis of the self-inspection 
checklist. 
C. ANALYSIS OF DOD IG TO CMS COMPETENCIES  
The DoD IG reported deficiencies that were found from Hidaka and Owen (2015) 
were aligned into the key process areas identified in the Contract Management Maturity 
Model (CMMM) that were discussed in Chapter II. There are six contract management key 
process areas: Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, 
Contract Administration, and Contract Closeout. These six process areas were then broken 
down into key practice areas of focus. The number of deficiencies was calculated for each 
key practice area (Hidaka & Owen, 2015). A review of the key practice areas was 
completed and each was aligned to a section under the CMS matrix. A comparison was 
completed to determine where gaps occurred between the process areas of the DoD IG 
deficiencies and the CMS contract life cycle of Pre-Award, Award, Post-Award matrix.  
1. Pre-Award Process: Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, 
Solicitation 
Three of the DoD IG Key Processes: Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning 
and Solicitation were covered by the CMS Pre-Award area. In the procurement planning 
section of the DoD IG report, the Air Force received 30 deficiencies or about 23% of the 
Air Force’s total reported deficiencies. About half of those deficiencies were found in just 
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acquisition planning. The Solicitation Planning phase had a total of 24 deficiencies or about 
18% of the total. The majority were related to determining contract type/incentives. Under 
the Solicitation phase, only seven deficiencies were found which was just above 5% of the 
total. Overall, the Air Force had nearly half of its deficiencies with 46.5%, in the Pre-Award 
Phase (Hidaka & Owen, 2015). 
Table 2 cross-references the alignment of each grouped deficiency with the CMS 
in the Pre-Award contract life cycle phase. This was done to determine how the DoD IG 
deficiencies align with the NCMA CMS competency model to identify any potential trends. 
Table 2. CMS Competencies—Pre-Award. 
 
Adapted from Hidaka & Owen (2015) and CMS (2019). 
 










2.1.1.1 Shape Internal Customer Requirements
Perform Needs Assessment PP-1 5
Perform Requirements Assessment PP-1 5
Identify Measurable Outcomes and Incentives SP-5 9
Verify Availability of Funds
2.1.1.2 Conduct Market Research PP-4,PP-5, 5,4
Identify Potential Suppliers SP-1 0
Evaluate Requirement Achievability PP-3 15
Conduct Pre-Offer Conference S-2 1
2.1.1.3 Perform Risk Analysis
Make or Buy Assessment
Supply or Services Determination PP-2 1
Develop Delivery Schedule
Determine Owner-Furnished Property/IT/Equip
2.1.1.4 Formulate Contract Strategy
Select Contract Type SP-5 9
Select Contract Method SP-2 3
Determine Business & Regulatory Requirements SP-6 3
Formulate Offer Evaluation Plan
2.1.1.5 Finalize Solicitation Plan SP-3 7
2.1.2 Request Offers
2.1.2.1 Execute Solicitation Plan PP-3 15
2.1.2.2 Prepare Solicitations SP-4 2
Respond to Questions from Potential Offers
2.1.2.3 Issue/Publicize Solicitations S-1 2
2.1.2.4 Amend Solicitations S-3 4
Total Pre-Award Deficiencies 61
CROSS REFERENCE OF CMS COMPETENCIES TO DODIG CONTRACT MANGEMENT KEY PROCESS 
AREAS
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As reflected in Table 2, when compared to what the DoD IG covered in its 
inspection against the CMS matrix it was found that although many of the competencies 
were covered, there were many items under the CMS matrix that were not covered by the 
DoD IG identified deficiencies or were difficult to align. For example, Verifying 
Availability of Funds under CMS 2.1.1.1 was never identified as a deficiency under any 
part of the inspection. This is arguably the most important aspect of the contract planning 
process. Another area, CMS 2.1.1.3 Perform Risk Analysis was not represented in the 
deficiency areas. The only aspect covered under Risk Analysis was the determination of 
supply or service. Overall, in this section the DoD IG’s assessment found identified 
deficiencies in most aspects of the CMS Pre-Award model, leaving only a few gaps. 
However, even with many Pre-Award CMS areas free of reported deficiencies, the majority 
of the Air Force deficiencies were also found in this section. 
2. Award Process:  Source Selection  
The Award competencies from the CMS were only covered in the Source Section 
contract management key process areas. Under the Source Selection key activities, the Air 
Force received 25 deficiencies (Hidaka & Owen, 2015). These deficiencies were fairly 
evenly disbursed between evaluating proposals, applying evaluation criteria, and 
negotiating contract terms and conditions. There were a few deficiencies in contractor 
responsibility standards, and no deficiencies in the other two categories. Overall, the 
Source Selection area of the DoD IG deficiencies received 19.1% of the total Air Force 
deficiencies (Hidaka & Owen, 2015). Table 3 illustrates how DoD IG key processes 
deficiencies align under the CMS Award competencies. 
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Table 3. CMS Competencies—Award. 
 
Adapted from Hidaka & Owen (2015) and NCMA CMBOK CMS (2019). 
 
As reflected in Table 3, when the DoD IG reported deficiencies were compared to 
the CMS matrix, it was determined that the key process areas were broader and that one 
evaluated element, SS-1 Evaluate Proposals, could be applied to multiple sections under 
the CMS award competencies. The key activities were broader than compared to the CMS 
competencies; it is hard to discern what specifically the deficiencies were attributed to 
under the CMS. However, there appears to be many gaps in what the DoD IG deficiencies 
and the CMS matrix. For example, the CMS competencies specifically refers to plan 
negotiations, while the DoD IG deficiency was in negotiating the terms and conditions of 
the contract. Overall, the gaps where no key process area was identified for a CMS 
competency appears due to the broad nature of the key process areas. They fit at a higher 
level, but were hard to apply to more specific areas. The award phase had the least amount 
of reported deficiencies identified in the DoD IG reports (Hidaka & Owen, 2015). 










3.1.1  Cost or Price Analysis
3.1.1.1 Comprehend Offer SS-1 6
3.1.1.2 Evaluate Seller Terms and Their Impact on Risk SS-1 6
3.1.1.3 Determine Reasonable Pricing SS-1 6
3.1.1.4 Document Analysis Results
3.1.2 Plan Negotiations SS-3 8
3.1.2.1 Clarification Requests
3.1.2.2 Document Objective
3.1.3 Select Source SS-5 0
3.1.3.1 Review Compliance of Offer(s) SS-1 6
3.1.3.2
Source Selection/Evaluate Offers in Accordance with 
Evaluation Criteria SS-1 SS-2, SS-4 6, 7, 4
3.1.3.3 Conduct Negotiations SS-3 8
3.1.3.4 Finalize Negotiations
3.1.3.5 Finalize Offer Revision
3.1.3.6 Prepare Contract Document
3.1.3.7 Finalize Contract Award
3.1.3.8 Document Outcome of Offer
3.1.4 Manage Disagreements
3.1.4.1 Submit Protests and Appeals SS-6 0
3.1.4.2 Respond to Protest and Appeals SS-6 0
Total Award Deficiencies 25
CMS Competencies 3.0 Award
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3. Post Award Process:  Contract Administration, Contract Closeout  
The Post-Award competencies from the CMS were covered by two of the key 
process areas: Contract Administration, and Contract Closeout. In the contract 
administration section of the DoD IG reported deficiencies, the Air Force received 42 
deficiencies or about 32% of the Air Forces total reported deficiencies (Hidaka & Owen, 
2015). The majority of the deficiencies were associated with CA-11, comply with terms 
and conditions, and CA-5, monitor and measure contract performance. The contract 
closeout section received only three deficiencies, which was just 2.3% of the total (Hidaka 
& Owen, 2015). Overall, the Post-Award process accounts for 34.4% of the total Air Force 
deficiencies reported. Table 4 depicts how the key process areas and associated deficiencies 
compare to the CMS matrix in the post-award phase. 
Table 4. CMS Competencies—Post-Award. 
 









4.1.1 Administer Contract CA-7,CA-9, CA-10, 0
Conduct Post Award Conference Meetings CA-1 0
Manage Contract Payment Process CA-8 7
Administer Owner-Furnished Property, Equipment CA-4 1
Establish/Maintain Communications
Evaluate Contractor Performance CA-5 11
4.1.2 Ensure Quality 
Plan for Contract Performance Delivery CA-6
Plan for Contract Performance Monitoring CA-5 11
Inspect and Accept Contract Performance 
4.1.3 Subcontract Management 
Determine Supply Chain Requirements CA-3 2
Issue Subcontracts 
4.1.4 Manage Changes 
Mange Contract Changes CA-2 3
Conduct Contract Interpretation CA-11 18
Determine Contract Termination CCO-6
4.2 Close Out CCO-5
Validate Contract Performance CCO-2 1
Verify Physical Contract Completion CCO-1 2
Prepare Contract Completion Documents CCO-3 0
Coordinate Final Disposition of Owner-Provided Property CCO-7 0
Reconcile Contract CC-O6 0
Make Final Payment CCO-4 0
Finalize Contract CCO-8 0
Total Post-Award Deficiencies 45
CMS Competencies  4.0 Post-Award 
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As reflected in Table 4, the key practice activities were aligned under the CMS 
matrix to discern how they compare and to see if there were any gaps that could be 
identified. Table 4 shows the Post-Award process under the CMS align well with what the 
DoD IG inspected. A few areas did not align well with the CMS; for example, inspect and 
accept contract performance, issue subcontracts, and establish and maintain 
communications. In this situation the key practice actives that were more specific than what 
the CMS had, but that still fit broadly under the contract administration umbrella.  
The previous discussion aligned the DoD IG reports and identified deficiencies with 
the CMS. Air Force contracting organizations prepare for IG inspections by conducting 
self-inspections. The Air Force has a self-inspection checklist that is used to conduct these 
self-inspections as they prepare for a formal IG inspection. The next section will compare 
the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist to the CMS to analyze any potential 
gaps. 
D. ANALYSIS OF AIR FORCE CONTRACTING SELF-INSPECTION 
CHECKLIST TO CMS  
For this section of the analyses, the phases of the CMS and the Air Force 
Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist are both broken down into pre-award, award and 
post-award. The checklist also covers some of the major tasks under the CMS such as 
acquisition planning, market research, source selection, cost/price analysis, as examples. It 
also is very specific to special governmental contract management tasks; e.g., 
determinations and findings, government furnished property, security requirements, as well 
as legal reviews and contract clearances. There are separate sections for research and 
development, construction, and architect-engineering type contracts. Finally, the checklist 
also has inspection items to review unit self-inspection programs and contracting officer 
appointments and warrants (Air Force Self-Inspection Checklist, retrieved from internal 
server, May 10, 2020). 
Similar to the DoD IG discrepancy analysis in the previous section, we aligned the 
checklist items where we believe they best fit under the CMS matrix. Overall, it appears 
that the self-inspection checklist is not meant to inspect each task as shown in the CMS, 
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but rather focus on areas where the Air Force has historically had deficiencies. This was 
also discussed in the previous section where the majority of the discrepancies noted were 
in the areas of procurement planning or risk analysis. In the next section, we will look at 
the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist and compare the checklist to the CMS. 
Tables 5-7 provide a cross-reference from the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection 
Checklist to the CMS process areas. Table 5 shows the CMS pre-award phase 
competencies aligned to the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist. 
Table 5. CMS Competencies—Pre-Award Aligned with Air Force 
Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist. 
 
Adapted from NMCA CMBOK CMS (CMS, 2019) and Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection 
Checklist (AFFARS MP5301.60-91, n.d.). 
 
AF Self Inspection Checklist
CMS Competencies 2.0 Pre-Award
2.1  Develop Solicitation
2.1.1. Plan Solicitation
2.1.1.1 Shape Internal Customer Requirements
Perform Needs Assessment
Perform Requirements Assessment
Identify Measurable Outcomes and Incentives
Verify Availability of Funds 1.1. Purchase Request/Funding
2.1.1.2 Conduct Market Research 1.3 Source List/Market Research
Identify Potential Suppliers 1.4 Small Business Coordination
Evaluate Requirement Achievability
Conduct Pre-Offer Conference
2.1.1.3 Perform Risk Analysis
Make or Buy Assessment
Supply or Services Determination
Develop Delivery Schedule
Determine Owner-Furnished Property/IT/Equip 1.13 Government Property
2.1.1.4 Formulate Contract Strategy 1.7 Determinations and Approvals
Select Contract Type 1.7.1.7 Contract Type
Select Contract Method
Determine Business & Regulatory Requirements
1.6 Other than Full and Open Competition                          
1.9 Proposal Reps and Certs                   
1.10 Subcontracting Plans
Formulate Offer Evaluation Plan
2.1.1.5 Finalize Solicitation Plan 1.2 Acquisition Planning
2.1.2 Request Offers
2.1.2.1 Execute Solicitation Plan
2.1.2.2 Prepare Solicitations
Respond to Questions from Potential Offers
2.1.2.3 Issue/Publicize Solicitations 1.5 Synopsis of Proposed Contract Action
2.1.2.4 Amend Solicitations
1.24 Other Contract Actions
1.25 Assistance Instruments
1.26 Broad Agency Announcements
1.27 Construction
1.28 A&E Services
CMS Competencies  
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1. CMS Competency 2.0—Pre-Award 
As reflected in Table 5, the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist 
addresses specific areas of pre-award planning, such as market research, determining 
contract type, and acquisition planning as indicated in Table 5. However, it does not have 
a specific alignment to some of the key tasks under CMS 2.1.1.1, 2.1.1.2 and 2.1.1.3 which 
are needed to fully develop the requirement. Rather, the self-inspection checklist simply 
uses the over-arching term of Acquisition Planning to encompass these tasks. Secondly, in 
this section, we see another gap or a lack of direct alignment under solicitation planning, 
preparing, and amending solicitations. These are the CMS tasks shown under 2.1.2.1, 
2.1.2.2 and, 2.1.2.4. Finally, the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist addresses 
areas not covered under the CMS. These are specialized contract types, such as Assistance 
Instruments, Broad Agency Announcements, Construction and Architect and Engineering 
Services. These could be aligned to CMS Task 2.1.1.4, Formulating Contract Strategy, 
however, it was decided that the questions asked under the self-inspection checklist for 
these special contract vehicles were specific to these areas and not part of determining the 
broader scope of contract type. 
The next section will compare the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist 
to the CMS 3.0 Award Competencies. Table 6 shows the CMS award phase competencies 
aligned to the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist. 
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Table 6. CMS Competencies—Award Aligned with Air Force Contracting 
Self-Inspection Checklist. 
 
Adapted from NMCA CMBOK CMS (CMS, 2019) and Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection 
Checklist (AFFARS MP5301.60-91, n.d.). 
2. CMS Competency 3.0—Award  
As reflected in Table 6, in comparing the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection 
Checklist to CMS Competencies for Section 3.0, Award, the areas for self-inspection align 
closely to the CMS as indicated in Table 6. The only gap appears to be in tasks at the top 
of the chart, which cover evaluation and documentation of the seller’s offer. This could be 
covered on the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist under 1.16 Source 
Selection as the price reasonableness determination is covered in the overall source 
selection documentation. The self-inspection checklist item that most closely aligns with 
the CMS tasks at 3.1.1 is 1.14 Cost/Pricing. The inspection questions, however, focus on 
both competitive and non-competitive cost/price analysis and documentation. Overall, this 
AF Self Inspection Checklist
CMS Competencies 3.0 Award
3.1 Form Contract      
3.1.1  Cost or Price Analysis 1.14 Cost/Pricing
3.1.1.1 Comprehend Offer
3.1.1.2 Evaluate Seller Terms and Their Impact on Risk
3.1.1.3 Determine Reasonable Pricing
3.1.1.4 Document Analysis Results
3.1.2 Plan Negotiations
3.1.2.1 Clarification Requests 1.17 Legal Review
3.1.2.2 Document Objective
3.1.3 Select Source
3.1.3.1 Review Compliance of Offer(s)
1.15 Security Requirements                         
1.9 Proposal/Representations and 
Certifications                          
3.1.3.2
Source Selection/Evaluate Offers in Accordance with 
Evaluation Criteria
1.11 Contractor Responsibility                         
1.16 Source Selection                              
1.17  Legal Review                                 
1.18 Technical Review                             
1.30 Compliance with DoD's Only one Offer 
3.1.3.3 Conduct Negotiations
1.17 Legal Review                                       
1.19 Clearance Review & Approval
3.1.3.4 Finalize Negotiations 1.14 Cost/Pricing
3.1.3.5 Finalize Offer Revision
3.1.3.6 Prepare Contract Document 1.8 Solicitation/Contractual Document    
3.1.3.7 Finalize Contract Award
1.8 Solicitation/Contractual Document                                              
1.17 Legal Review                                   
1.19 Clearance Review & Approval
3.1.3.8 Document Outcome of Offer 1.20 Distribution
3.1.4 Manage Disagreements
3.1.4.1 Submit Protests and Appeals  1.21 Protests Before/After Award
3.1.4.2 Respond to Protest and Appeals  1.21 Protests Before/After Award
CMS Competencies  
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section of the CMS appears to be well-aligned with the Air Force Contracting Self-
Inspection Checklist. 
The next section will compare the self-inspection checklist to the CMS 4.0 Post-
Award Competencies. Table 7 shows the CMS post-award phase competencies aligned to 
the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist. 
Table 7. CMS Competencies—Post-Award Aligned with Air Force 
Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist. 
 
Adapted from Data from NMCA CMBOK CMS (CMS, 2019) and Air Force Contracting Self-
Inspection Checklist (AFFARS MP5301.60-91, n.d.). 
3. CMS Competency 4.0—Post-Award  
As reflected in Table 7, the comparison between the Air Force Contracting Self-
Inspection Checklist and the CMS was the most misaligned. Under the self-inspection 
checklist, Section 1.23 is labeled Contract Administration, and it does have a question 
regarding conducting post-award conferences; however, Section 1.23 of the self-inspection 
AF Self Inspection Checklist
4.1 Contract Performance 
4.1.1 Administer Contract 1.23 Contract Administration
Conduct Post Award Conference Meetings
Manage Contract Payment Process 
Administer Owner-Furnished Property, Equipment 1.13 Government Property
Establish/Maintain Communications 1.20 Distribution 
Evaluate Contractor Performance 
4.1.2 Ensure Quality 
Plan for Contract Performance Delivery 
Plan for Contract Performance Monitoring 
1.17 Legal Review                                        
1.21 Protests Before/After Award
Inspect and Accept Contract Performance 
4.1.3 Subcontract Management 
Determine Supply Chain Requirements 
Issue Subcontracts 1.10 Subcontracting Plans
4.1.4 Manage Changes 1.29 Ratifications
Mange Contract Changes 
1.12 UCA and Unpriced Changes                               
1.14 Cost/Pricing
Conduct Contract Interpretation 
Determine Contract Termination 
4.2 Close Out 
Validate Contract Performance 1.22 Quality Assurance
Verify Physical Contract Completion 2.10 Oversight of Q&A Program
Prepare Contract Completion Documents




CMS Competencies  
CMS Competencies  4.0 Post-Award 
2.7 Contract Closeout
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checklist also has questions on terminations, options, award fees, adequate accounting 
systems and novation agreements. This section of the self-inspection checklist, does not 
direct the inspector to review any of the contract payment process or evaluation of the 
contractor’s performance, which are tasks under 4.1.1 in the CMS. A key aspect of ensuring 
the buyer (government) gets what they pay for is evaluating contractor performance and 
monitoring contract delivery. This appears to be a gap in the Air Force Contracting Self-
Inspection Checklist under Post Award. Another gap between the CMS and the Air Force 
Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist is under Subcontract Management, CMS task, 4.1.3. 
The self-inspection checklist covers Subcontracting Plans under Section 1.10; however, 
the questions on the self-inspection checklist under this section primarily focus on whether 
or not a subcontracting plan is needed and whether the reporting is being done. The CMS 
task 4.1.3 shows a competency for determining supply-chain requirements under 
subcontracts and this is clearly a gap in the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection 
Checklist. The remaining areas of closing out a contract are adequately addressed in both 
the CMS and the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Based on the analysis of the DoD IG identified Air Force contracting deficiencies 
and the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist, the following are our 
recommendations for opportunities for additional training for the contracting workforce 
and opportunities for revisions to the self-inspection checklist. 
It is recommended that the Air Force focus more training and education in the pre-
award life cycle, since nearly half of the reported DoD IG deficiencies fell under the CMS 
competencies for pre-award. Specifically, the Air Force should focus on training that 
assists its workforce in being proficient in developing the solicitation, performing market 
research and formulating the contract strategy. Focusing on training to eliminate 
deficiencies in pre-award activities, will set contracts and contract managers up for success 
leading to more effective award decisions and less contract administration burdens. 
Because of the low number of deficiencies, in the award and post-award processes, we did 
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not identify any specific training opportunities for these phases of the contract management 
life cycle. 
Secondly, recommended revisions to the self-inspection checklist would be 
beneficial in both the pre-award and post-award life cycle phases in order to be more 
aligned with the CMS. The current self-inspection checklist does not provide an in-depth 
review of all aspects of acquisition planning or pre-solicitation planning. Sound acquisition 
planning is the cornerstone to developing a good contract. In addition, if ambiguity in the 
requirement is removed before the solicitation is released, this may also result in a better 
contract with less contract administration burdens. The results of the analysis showed there 
are no gaps in the award phase of the current self-inspection checklist; therefore, there are 
no recommended changes to the award phase section of the self-inspection checklist. The 
Air Force checklist adequately focuses on the award phase of the contract management life 
cycle. Under the post-award review of the self-inspection checklist when compared to the 
CMS, there are gaps. The self-inspection checklist does not currently address review of the 
contractor payment process, contractor evaluations, or supply-chain requirements under 
subcontracts. It is recommended the Air Force review the CMBOK CMS and add these 
specific areas, as they are important again to reducing overall contract administration 
burden and are critical to ensuring the government is getting what is paid for under the 
contract. Additionally, we found that post-award contract management is a key area of 
concern for the DoD IG as discussed in the next paragraph. 
As introduced above, we found that lack of contract payment and contract 
surveillance oversight has been identified by the DoD IG as one of the top ten management 
challenges discussed in their FY 2020 report titled, Top DoD Management Challenges 
(DoD IG Report, 2020). It is a key area of concern from the DoD IG Office because 
according to the Report, “DoD acquisitions and contracts continue to be at high risk for 
fraud” (DoD IG Report, 2020, p. 120). Additionally, lack of adequate payment data can 
affect the contracting officer’s ability to establish a fair and reasonable price (DoD IG 
Report, 2020). These issues contribute significantly to government overpayments and 
procurement fraud issues. This validates our findings that lack of contractor payment 
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review in the self-inspection checklist is significant and in order to avoid procurement fraud 
issues, the Air Force should modify the checklist. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the findings from our research. We first discussed the 
findings from the results of the comparison of DoD IG deficiencies with the Contract 
Management Standard. This resulted in a recommendation for more training and education 
opportunities in the pre-award phase of the contract management life cycle. Next, we 
discussed the comparison of the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist to the 
Contract Management Standard. This analysis led us to recommend changes to the pre-
award and post-award phases of the contract management life cycle. Particularly in the area 
of contract oversight, as this is validated by the DoD IG Management Challenges 2020 
report. In summary, our findings identified opportunities for improvement were found in 
both the training and education as well as updating the Air Force Contracting Self-
Inspection Checklist to ensure the Air Force has the most competent workforce as well as 
effective internal controls. In Chapter V, we will provide a summary of our conclusions 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will summarize our research by first discussing the background which 
led to the purpose of our research. We accomplished this research by answering our 
research questions which are discussed in the conclusion. This chapter closes with 
recommended areas for future research. 
B. SUMMARY 
With contract management listed as one of GAO’s high-risk areas, the DoD has 
been conducting thorough reviews of its business practices to identify areas where 
efficiencies can be gained (Mihm, 2019 & Defense Budget Overview, 2019). In response 
to this, SAF/ACQ began developing lines of effort to meet DoD’s directive. From this 
charge the Air Force Contracting Flight Plan was created to align Air Force contracting 
with the mission and the national defense strategy (AF Flight Plan, 2019). To meet this 
charge, the workforce needs be transformed into mission-focused business leaders that 
think strategically and execute as efficiently industry leaders (AF Flight Plan, 2019). 
The demand for Air Force contracting to develop the contract management 
workforce to be mission-focused business leaders is becoming more important. They are 
no longer just business advisors. They are relied upon to be agile, adaptive and 
knowledgeable in all areas of contract management. Saddled with the demand to move 
quickly in an arena that is a GAO defined high-risk area the contracting workforce needs 
skills and competencies to help them succeed. This requires a competency model and 
auditable checklists that align with the knowledge and skills required by today’s 
contracting workforce. The results of this research can be utilized to identify gaps and 
training opportunities to equip the contracting workforce with the skills and competencies 
to effectively perform their duties in a fast-paced environment while potentially reducing 
deficiencies. 
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We accomplished our research by aligning the Air Force-specific DoD IG 
deficiencies with the NCMA CMS competency framework to identify any gaps to provide 
opportunities for additional training. This research also looked at the Air Force Contracting 
Self Inspection checklist and how it aligned with the CMS. This was completed to help 
improve the internal control tool utilized by Air Force contracting organizations. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Through this research and analysis of the DoD IG report and how it aligns to the 
CMS as well as the analysis of the CMS compared to the Air Force Contracting Self- 
Inspection Checklist the following questions were answered: 
1. How Air Force contracting deficiencies reported by the DoD IG align with 
the NCMA CMS competency model? 
The DoD IG deficiencies alignment to the CMS was shown in Tables 2 through 4. 
The tables show that most of the activities from the DoD IG were able to align with the 
CMS. Overall, the DoD IG deficiencies were defined at a broader level, which made it 
difficult to identify exactly where the deficiencies align under the CMS. It also showed 
some gaps, where the CMS had competencies that were not inspected under the DoD IG.  
Our analysis also revealed that the majority of the Air Force deficiencies were 
aligned in the Pre-Award phase of the CMS matrix with 46.5% of the deficiencies found 
in this phase. The Award phase had the fewest deficiencies with only 19.1%, and Post-
Award phase followed with 34.4% of the deficiencies.  
2. How does the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist align with 
the NCMA CMS competency model?  
The Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist did not align completely with 
the CMS as shown in Tables 5 through 7. There were areas that directly aligned and others 
that did not. Through the analysis, we were able to find that in the pre-award and award 
phases, while not directly aligned by specific task, the CMS and self-inspection checklist 
covered mostly the same areas. Additionally, our analysis revealed that the Air Force 
Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist was more broadly focused on the pre-award tasks 
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versus the post-award contract administration tasks. For example, the contracting self-
inspection checklist did not cover contractor evaluations, or supply chain management of 
subcontracts, which are very specifically outlined as tasks in the CMS under post-award. 
These are also areas of high concern to the DoD IG, thus emphasizing the recommendation 
to update the checklist to inspect these key tasks. 
3. What opportunities for additional training for the contracting workforce 
and opportunities for revisions to the self-inspection checklist were 
identified?  
It was determined the Air Force has an opportunity to focus more training and 
education on pre-award activities. Since nearly half of the reported DoD IG deficiencies 
fell under the CMS competencies for pre-award. Specifically, the Air Force should focus 
on training that helps develop their workforce in the pre-award phase of the contract 
management life cycle. 
For the Air Force Contracting Self-Inspection Checklist analysis, an opportunity 
was found to improve the post-award section. The Air Force should consider adding a few 
additional areas for inspection, such as contractor evaluations and review of contractor 
payments to focus on the post-award life cycle phase. This, combined with the focus the 
Air Force already uses to inspect pre-award and award life cycle phases, should provide 
leaders with the confidence the full spectrum of contract management phases, domains, 
and job tasks are being completed accurately and effectively. 
D. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
Based on this research, we recommend the following areas of further research. 
This research covered two parts of the auditability triangle by using the DoD IG 
reported deficiencies as an indicator of competent personnel and the Air Force Contracting 
Self-Inspection Checklist as an indicator of internal controls, and comparing them to the 
NCMA CMS. An area for further research is to complete the auditability triangle (Rendon 
& Rendon, 2015). This can be completed by reviewing previous process capability 
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assessments and determine if the findings can be aligned with the CMS to conduct a process 
capability assessment.  
Secondly, use the CMS to compare the DoD IG deficiencies with the other DoD 
services identified in Hidaka and Owen (2015).  
Third, use the CMS to compare the applicable DoD services’ self-inspection 
checklists, if applicable, to determine if there are opportunities for training, education or 
revision of these service self-inspection checklists and align with the CMS. Perhaps further 
research could determine if a need exists for a DoD self-inspection checklist aligned with 
the CMS that applies to all the services.  
Finally, if the DoD adopts the CMS contract management competency framework, 
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